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and “1 other residence” selected by the taxpayer and used
as a residence.19
•  The term “principal residence” is defined as it is for
purposes of the sale and reinvestment provision20 which
was repealed in 1997.21 The regulations state that a
principal residence can include “a houseboat, a
housetrailer, or stock held by a tenant-stockholder in a
cooperative housing corporation.”22
•  The term “1 other residence” is defined in terms of the
I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1) requirements for use as a residence.23
That provision specifies that “use as a residence” means
use of a “dwelling unit” by the taxpayer for personal
purposes for a number of days per year which exceeds the
greater of—(1) 14 days or (2) 10 percent of the number of
days during the year for which the unit is rented at a fair
rental.24
Meaning of “dwelling unit”
The statute defines “dwelling unit” as a “house,
apartment, condominium, mobile home, boat, or similar
property and all structures or other property appurtenant to
such dwelling unit.”25 The term does not include that part
of a unit used exclusively as a hotel, motel, inn, or similar
establishment.26
The regulations further specify that a “dwelling unit”
must provide basic living accommodations such as
“sleeping space, toilet, and cooking facilities.”27 Moreover,
a single structure may contain more than one dwelling
unit.28
In conclusion
Provided the second residence is within the dollar
limitations, secures the loan, and meets the occupancy
requirements, a dwelling providing basic living
accommodations should be eligible for an interest
deduction even if the dwelling is in the form of a boat or
mobile home.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 28.05[3][a]
(1998).
2 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(I).
3 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(II).
4 Pub. L. No. 99-514, Sec. 511(b), 100 Stat. 2244 (1986).
5 Id.
6 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i).
7 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D).
8 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i).
9 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii).
10 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(I.).
11 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(II).
12 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(0).
13 Id.
14 Ltr. Rul. 8906031, Nov. 10, 1988.
15 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
16 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
17 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
18 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(I).
19 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(II).
20 I.R.C. § 1034.
21 TRA-97, Sec. 312(b), repealing I.R.C. § 1034.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3)(i).
23 I.R.C. § 163(h)(5)(A)(i)(II).
24 I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1).
25 I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(A).
26 I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(B).
27 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-1(c)(1).
28 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The disputed strip of land was bordered by the
remnants of a fence which was situated on the plaintiff’s
land. The land was suitable for timber production. The
defendant had acquired the property from the defendant’s
grandfather and had walked the fence with the grandfather
who identified the fence as the boundary line of the
property. The defendant managed the strip as part of forest
land, pruning existing trees, thinning undesirable trees and
brush and planting new trees. The defendant also used the
property for horseback riding and other recreational
activities. The plaintiff argued that the defendant could not
acquire title to the disputed strip because the defendant did
not engage in activities on the land often enough to make
continuous use of the property. The court held that the
occasional use of the land for timber management and
recreation was sufficient for a rural property. The plaintiff
also argued that the defendant could not claim any
ownership of the property where the fence was not
maintained in good repair. The court held that the fence
was not required to be maintained in good repair where the
land was not used for activities which required a good
fence, such as for cattle pasture. The court held that the
remnants of the fence were sufficient to mark the existence
of the claimed boundary. Nooteboom v. Bulson, 956 P.2d
1042 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
ANIMALS
EXPERTS. The plaintiff had boarded a horse with the
defendant stables. The horse escaped and in the process of
capturing the horse, the defendant’s employees caused the
horse to fall. The injury was treated with no notice of any
bone fracture. However, the horse later showed signs of
lameness and the plaintiff sued for injury to the horse. The
horse, however, had a history of chronic lameness in the leg
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affected and a major issue in the case was whether the fall
contributed to the lameness which occurred after the fall.
The defendant had four expert witnesses who denied any
causation link with the fall. The plaintiff presented the
testimony of a witness with degrees in other sciences but no
study in veterinary science. The witness had no experience
in treating horse lameness and only had experience with
lameness in a horse the witness owned. The witness had
knowledge of horses in general. The court held that expert
witness testimony was required to show causation between
the fall and the injury and that the plaintiff’s witness was
not sufficiently qualified to be an expert witness on horse
lameness. Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., 578
N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1998).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISMISSAL. In attempting to avoid foreclosure against
the debtors’ farmland, the debtors transferred the land to a
buyer and retained a right to repurchase the land at a later
date. The debtors were unable to obtain financing or
another buyer and the option expired. The buyer filed suit
to evict the debtors who prevented that action by filing for
bankruptcy. The debtors argued that the sale was actually a
loan transaction and had litigated that issue in the state
courts without success. The Bankruptcy Court held that it
was barred from relitigating the issue and that the filing for
bankruptcy was made in bad faith in that the debtors were
attempting to circumvent the state courts’ judgments. The
court held that the case would be dismissed for bad faith. In
re Hatcher, 218 B.R. 441 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 1998).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. A corporation sold a
ranch to a limited partnership and retained an option to
repurchase a portion of the ranch. The corporation filed for
bankruptcy and as part of that case, the debtor filed a
Notice of Assumption which assumed some executory
contracts and rejected all executory contracts not expressly
assumed. The option was not mentioned as one of the
assumed executory contracts. The limited partnership also
filed for bankruptcy and sought to sell the ranch to a second
limited partnership free and clear of the option. The issue
was whether the option was an executory contract, rejected
as part of the Notice of Assumption. The lower courts had
followed In re Easebe Enters., 900 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.
1990), which they interpreted as holding that all option
contracts were executory. The appellate court, en banc,
held that interpretation was too broad and held that an
option contract was executory only when there remained
performance required by both parties at the time of the
bankruptcy petition. If the option had not been exercised by
some act of the option holder, the option contract is not
executory. In re Robert L. Helms Const. & Dev. Co.,
Inc., 139 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’g and rem’g., 110
F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1997).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was of advanced age and
living in a retirement community when the debtor caused
an automobile accident. The injured party sued the debtor
for an amount in excess of the insurance carried by the
debtor. The debtor’s family members worked with the
debtor to convert most of the debtor’s liquid, non-exempt
assets into the purchase of a residence, effectively
removing the assets from the reach of the injured party who
was a creditor in the bankruptcy case. In order to move to
the residence, the debtor had to hire a live-in nurse. The
residence was clearly larger than needed by the debtor and
was expanded in order to use up all of the liquid assets. The
court held that the debtor was not entitled to an exemption
for the residence because the residence was purchased as
part of a fraudulent transfer. In re Sholdan, 218 B.R. 475
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1998), on rem. from, 108 F.3d 886 (8th
Cir. 1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. In June 1992, the IRS
assessed the debtor for unpaid taxes for 1984 through 1986
and in April 1993, the IRS filed a tax lien notice. The IRS
levied against the debtor’s social security benefits,
including levies made within 90 days before the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The debtor sought recovery of the
amounts levied within 90 days before the petition filing.
The central issue was whether the IRS received more from
the levies than it would have received in the bankruptcy
case. The debtor argued that, if the benefits were not levied,
the debtor might have spent the proceeds and the proceeds
would not have been available for distribution to the IRS.
The IRS noted that the benefits were exempt as to all other
claims except the tax claims; therefore, it was entitled to
the proceeds in any case. The court held that the debtor’s
right to receive the social security benefits was an interest
in property attachable by a tax lien and the transfer of the
benefits occurred when the tax lien became effective, the
date of the assessment of the taxes. The effective date as to
third parties would be the date of the filing of the tax lien
notice. Because the tax lien became effective more than 90
days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the
transfer of the benefits occurred more than 90 days before
the petition and was not preferential. In re Roberts, 219
B.R. 573 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
CONTRACTS
EXCUSED PERFORMANCE. The plaintiff entered
into contracts to sell 1.2 million pounds of rice directly to a
processor, the defendant. The processor needed the rice
solely to meet a contract with a processed foods retailer
who was marketing a brand of ready-to-eat rice products.
The sale contract provided that if the market conditions
made the processing of rice uneconomical, the defendant
was excused from performance on the contract. The retailer
backed out of its contract with the defendant when the rice
product did not sell as anticipated. The defendant then
refused any additional shipments of rice from the plaintiff
but helped the plaintiff locate another buyer. That buyer
decided against purchasing the remaining rice when the
plaintiff could not provide proof of ownership of the rice.
The plaintiff then sued for breach of contract  and asked for
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damages equal to lost profits. The court held that the
defendant was excused from performance because (1) the
plaintiff could not demonstrate ownership of the remaining
rice due under the contract and (2) the market condition
provision in the contract allowed the defendant to refuse
shipments when its buyer stopped buying rice. Guillory
Farms, Inc. v. Amigos Canning Co., 966 S.W.2d 830
(Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. An Illinois jury
awarded a grain producer over $200,000 in punitive and
other damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duty by
a grain elevator resulting from a hedge-to-arrive contract.
The producer had apparently attempted to buy out the
contract or roll over the commitment under the contract but
the elevator had refused and demanded payment of the
margin, which exceeded the value of the grain. Information
on this case was submitted by Scott Buchanan of Algona,
IA and Nicholas Iavarone of Chicago.
SEED GROWING CONTRACT. The plaintiff grew
seed corn for the defendant. The growing contract provided
that the defendant supplied the seed for the crop and that
the plaintiff had the responsibility for any damage to the
crop from application of herbicides. The contract required
the plaintiff to notify the defendant before applying any
herbicides to the crop and gave the defendant the right to
prohibit the use of any herbicide. The plaintiff had noticed
a large amount of grass in the field and asked the defendant
for recommendation of a herbicide to use. The defendant
recommended a specific herbicide which the plaintiff
applied. The plaintiff testified that the plaintiff thought it
was required to use the herbicide. The seed crop was
apparently damaged by the herbicide and the plaintiff sued
for breach of contract for the loss of crop. The defendant
counterclaimed for the same loss based on the contract
provision that made the plaintiff responsible for any
herbicide damage. The plaintiff argued that the contract
was ambiguous where the defendant requested the use of a
herbicide because the contract also allowed the defendant
to enter the fields to determine whether the plaintiff was
growing the crop properly. The court held that the contract
was not ambiguous in assigning responsibility for crop
damage from herbicides to the plaintiff. The court noted
that the same provision gave the plaintiff the authority
whether to use a herbicide and that the provision gave the
defendant only the authority to prohibit the use of a
herbicide and not any authority to require the use of a
herbicide. Seegers v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 997
F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued interim
regulations amending the Catastrophic Risk Protection
(CAT) endorsement regulations to (1) delete the provisions
regarding the termination of the policy for failure to pay
CAT administrative fees since those provisions have been
incorporated into the Basic Provisions; (2) specify that the
administrative fee for CAT coverage for each crop in the
county will be $10 plus the greater of either $50 or 10
percent of the premium under the CAT policy; and (3)
revise the date CAT fees will be due to coincide, with when
the premium is due for additional coverage. This last rule
eliminates all references to refunding administrative fees in
the event that the producer decided to change coverage
levels prior to the sales closing date since fees would not
have been paid. Also, this rule makes the provisions
concerning the payment of administrative fees in the year
of application consistent with the payment of
administrative fees for limited coverage. This rule also
eliminates the termination provisions since they have been
incorporated into the Basic Provisions. 63 Fed. Reg. 40630
(July 30, 1998).
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued interim regulations
amending the regulations for the peanut price support
program to ease conditions for marketing Segregation 3
peanuts by allowing the peanuts to be reconditioned and
regraded in certain limited instances. Peanuts are graded as
``Segregation 3'' peanuts when they are found by visual
inspection to have Aspergillus flavus (A. flavus) mold. This
rule would allow a farmer whose peanuts were found at a
buying point inspection to have the mold to reclean those
peanuts at the buying point and have them visually
reinspected within 24 hours. The farmer could obtain such
a re-inspection only once for any given lot. This rule was
issued as an interim rule to allow relief with respect to the
1998 crop which should come to market shortly. 63 Fed.
Reg. 41711 (Aug. 5, 1998).
POULTRY AND RABBITS. The AMS has adopted as
final amendments to regulations governing the voluntary
poultry and rabbit grading programs. The revisions simplify
the definition about feathers on poultry, provide an
alternative grademark for poultry and rabbit products,
provide for the use of a “Prepared From” grademark to
officially identify specialized products that originate from
officially graded poultry, change the sample plan used by
graders, and increase the lighting intensity required at
grading stations. 63 Fed. Reg. 40627 (July 30, 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
REVOCABLE TRANSFERS. Before the decedent died
the decedent executed a durable power of attorney in favor
of an heir. Before the decedent died the heir issued several
checks on the decedent’s checking account to various heirs
but the checks were not delivered or cashed until after the
decedent died. The estate argued that, under the relation-
back doctrine, the date of the gifts related back to the date
the checks were executed, removing the gifts from the
decedent’s gross estate. The estate claimed that the
decedent could not revoke the gifts because the decedent
was too ill. The estate cited Estate of Metzger v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 204 (1993), aff’d, 38 F.3d 118
(4th Cir. 1994) as allowing use of the relation-back
doctrine to treat the checks as gifts on the date of execution,
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instead of the date the check is cashed. The court
distinguished Metzger as applying only to charitable gifts
and held that noncharitable gifts remain revocable until the
decedent’s death if not cashed before the decedent’s death.
Estate of Newman v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. No. 3 (1998).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCRUAL METHOD. The taxpayer was a
manufacturer on the accrual method of accounting. The
taxpayer offered retailers a cooperative advertising
agreement under which the taxpayer would reimburse
retailers a portion of expenses incurred to advertise the
taxpayer’s product. The retailer would obtain
reimbursement by submitting evidence of the advertising
and a statement of expenses. The IRS ruled that the
taxpayer could deduct the costs of the advertising in the tax
year the advertising was performed because the
manufacturer's liability to pay a retailer for cooperative
advertising services was incurred the year in which the
services were performed, provided the taxpayer was able to
reasonably estimate this liability, and even though the
retailer did not submit the required claim form until a later
tax year. Rev. Rul. 98-39, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The taxpayer
operated an automobile leasing business, including sales of
previously leased automobiles. During the lease periods,
the debtor carried insurance on the residual value of the
automobiles at the end of the leasing period. The issue was
the depreciation method allowed for the insurance costs.
The IRS ruled that the insurance premiums were to be
depreciated using the straight line depreciation method over
the leasing period of each automobile. Ltr. Rul. 9830001,
March 3, 1998.
FARM AND RANCH RISK MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTS. Legislation has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate to create a deduction for contributions made to a
“farm or ranch risk management account” (FARRM
account). The deduction would be limited to 20 percent of
the taxpayer’s taxable income from an eligible farming
business. An eligible farming business is defined as “any
farming business (as defined in [I.R.C.] section 263A(e)(4))
which is not a passive activity (within the meaning of
[I.R.C.] section 469(c)) of the taxpayer.” The contributions
are to be invested in cash or other interest bearing
obligations with trust income taxable to the trust. The
FARRM account is to be a grantor trust for the benefit of
the taxpayer and contributions are to be redistributed to the
grantor within five years, with distributions included in
income. S. 2371, § 201, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
INCOME. The taxpayer operated a small Belgian cattle
breeding operation in which the taxpayer bred cattle for the
taxpayer’s own business and acted as an agent for two other
breeders. The taxpayer did not keep accurate records of the
income and expenses of the business and did not file
income tax returns for three tax years. The IRS made
assessments determined by reconstruction of income based
on the taxpayer’s personal records. The taxpayer claimed
that some of the amounts received for cattle were actually
amounts received as agent for the other breeders and that
those amounts were paid by cash to the other breeders.
However, neither of the other breeders could substantiate
those cash payments. The taxpayer also claimed feed
expenses greater than those allowed by the IRS. The
taxpayer presented testimony from the feed dealers as to
the amount of feed purchased by cash. The court held that
the IRS determination of income was not disproved by the
taxpayer but that the additional expenses were sufficiently
proved by the taxpayer. The taxpayer was also not allowed
a deduction for travel expenses because the taxpayer had no
records to prove the expenses. Johnson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-275.
INCOME AVERAGING. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate to make the income
averaging for farmers provision permanent. TRA 1997, §
933(a) (1997), adding I.R.C. § 1301. See Harl, “Income
Averaging,” 8 Agric. L. Dig. 117 (1997). S. 2371, § 202,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
INTEREST. The taxpayers operated a dairy farm and
were found to have improperly underreported business
income by transferring assets and income to a corporation.
The taxpayer claimed that additional interest expense
incurred by the corporation should have also been
reallocated to them. However, the taxpayers presented no
evidence of a loan, a promissory note, the identity of a
creditor, or the amount of interest paid. The court held that
no interest deduction would be allowed. See also Scherping
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-384 and T.C. Memo. 1991-
388. Scherping v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-288.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayer corporation
acquired a contract oil drilling corporation. The acquired
corporation had unused net operating loss (NOL)
carryovers and claimed deductions for NOLs in tax years
after the acquisition by the taxpayer. The court found that
the acquired corporation continued in the same business as
before the acquisition and actively carried on that business,
even though no business was transacted for a couple of
years before the acquisition. The court noted that the oil
drilling business was at a standstill during this time and that
the acquired corporation was fully able and ready to
perform drilling services once the market for oil improved.
The court held that the unused net operating losses could be
carried forward to tax years after the acquisition. Samson
Invest. Co. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-271.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayer
was the sole shareholder of an S corporation and one of two
partners in a partnership. The IRS disallowed several
deductions on the taxpayer’s individual return which the
taxpayer claimed had passed through from the corporation
and partnership. The taxpayer’s individual return did not
include several items of income from the partnership’s K-1
forms. The court held that the IRS was not required to first
bring administrative adjustment proceedings against the
corporation and partnership because both entities had fewer
shareholders or partners than required by the administrative
122                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
adjustment provisions. The court also held that, as to the
partnership, the IRS was not required to file a FPAA
because the taxpayer’s individual return was not consistent
with the partnership K-1s and the taxpayer did not notify
the IRS about the inconsistency. The decision is designated
as not for publication. Davis v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,600 (10th Cir. 1998).
DEFINITION. The taxpayer and another person each
contributed 50 percent of the purchase price of two
commercial properties. One property was rented to third
parties for office space and the second property was rented
to a grocery store. The taxpayer agreed to share all income
and expenses equally with the other purchaser and the two
parties provided services to the tenants. No written
partnership agreement was executed and, on the advice of
an accountant, no partnership return was filed; however, the
taxpayer reported one-half of the profit and one-half of the
expenses on the taxpayer’s individual return. The court
held that the taxpayer and other party intended to operate
the properties as a partnership, holding that the parties
demonstrated sufficient intent to operate the business of
renting the properties as a partnership. Cusick v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1998-286.
PARTNER’S BASIS. The IRS has adopted as final
amendments to the regulations under I.R.C. § 465(b)(6)
governing the definition of qualified nonrecourse financing
which may be included in a partner’s basis in an interest in
a partnership. Section 465(b)(6) defines qualified
nonrecourse financing as any financing that (1) is borrowed
by the taxpayer for the activity of holding real property; (2)
is borrowed by the taxpayer from a qualified person or
represents a loan from any federal, state, or local
government or instrumentality thereof, or is guaranteed by
any federal, state, or local government; (3) is debt for
which, except to the extent provided in regulations, no
person is personally liable for repayment; and (4) is not
convertible debt. Section 465(b)(6)(A) provides that
qualified nonrecourse financing must be secured by real
property used in the activity of holding real property.
Section 465(b)(6)(E), however, provides that the activity of
holding real property includes the holding of personal
property that is incidental to making real property available
as living accommodations. The regulations provide that
financing can qualify as qualified nonrecourse financing if,
in addition to the real property used in the activity of
holding real property, the financing is secured by both real
property and other property that is incidental to the activity
of holding real property.
Section 465(b)(6)(B)(iii) provides that, except to the
extent provided in regulations, no person may be personally
liable for repayment of qualified nonrecourse financing. A
partnership is generally treated as a person under the IRC.
Thus, any financing for which a partnership is personally
liable is not qualified nonrecourse financing under section
465(b)(6)(B)(iii), even if no partner is personally liable for
the financing. The regulations provide that the personal
liability of a partnership (including an LLC that is treated
as a partnership) is disregarded in determining whether a
financing is qualified nonrecourse financing if the entity's
only assets are real property used in the activity of holding
real property or both real property and other property that is
incidental to the activity of holding real property, and no
other person is liable for the financing. In addition, the
regulations provide that the portion of nonrecourse
financing for which no person is personally liable can
qualify as qualified nonrecourse financing. 63 Fed. Reg.
41420 (Aug. 4, 1998), adding Treas. Reg. § 1.465-27.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in July 1998,
the weighted average is 6.55 percent with the permissible
range of 5.90 to 6.95 percent (90 to 106 percent
permissable range) and 5.90 to 7.21 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 98-
37, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
REFUND. The taxpayer had filed for an automatic
extension for filing 1986 taxes and had paid $25,000 with
the extension request. The taxpayer did not file the 1986
return until 1993 and that return claimed a refund of
$10,000. The IRS refused to pay the refund as time barred
under I.R.C. § 6511 because the refund request was not
made within two years after the taxes were paid. The
taxpayer argued that the $25,000 extension payment was
not a payment of the taxes but only a deposit and that the
taxes were not paid until the return was filed. The court
held that the extension payment was a payment of taxes for
purposes of I.R.C. § 6511 and that the refund claim was
time barred by the three year limitation period of I.R.C. §
6511(a). Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir.
1998).
RENT. The taxpayer was a corporation owned by two
dentists. The corporation leased a building from one of the
shareholders. The rent charged was based on research done
by the shareholders and was similar to the rent charged for
another building owned by the shareholder, except that the
other building’s rent was lower because the building was
unimproved. The rent was much higher, however, than was
charged to another dentist who rented a portion of the first
floor for one day per week. The court found that the rent
charged was the fair market rental for the space and was
fully deductible by the corporation. The court found that
the lower rent charged for space in the same building
resulted from the short usage limitation and other factors.
Associated Dentists of River Falls v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-287.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER. The taxpayer was a member of a law
firm which was an S corporation. In August 1989, the
corporation agreed to sell 1,000 shares of stock to the
taxpayer and the taxpayer was made president, managing
partner and chief financial officer of the corporation. The
corporation changed its name to include the taxpayer’s
name and filed form K-1 for 1989 and 1990 for the
taxpayer as a shareholder. The price for the shares was to
be paid in the future but the taxpayer did not make the
payment and in June 1990 left the firm. The court held that
actual issuance of the shares was not necessary for the
taxpayer to be treated as a shareholder. The court held that
the actions of the parties indicated that the taxpayer was a
shareholder as of the date of the agreement and should have
included the taxpayer’s share of the corporation income in
the taxpayer’s gross income for 1990. Pahl v. Comm’r,
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98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,602 (9th Cir. 1998),
aff’g,  T.C. Memo. 1996-176.
SALE OF FARM PROPERTY. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate which would allow natural
persons to exclude from income up to $500,000 ($250,000
for married persons filing separately) of gain from the sale
of qualified farm property, including land, during the
person’s lifetime. The provision is similar to the exclusion
of gain provision for the sale of a personal residence
enacted in 1997. Qualified farm property includes property
used for farming purposes by the taxpayer or a member of
the taxpayer’s family in which the taxpayer or a member of
the taxpayer’s family materially participates in the farming
operation. S. 2388, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998), adding
I.R.C. § 121A.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX. Although the taxpayer
had self-employment income, the taxpayer did not pay any
self-employment taxes with the taxpayer individual income
tax return. The taxpayer argued that the tax was
unconstitutional because the social security fund would not
be able to pay any benefits to the taxpayer when the
taxpayer retired. The court held that the self-employment
tax was constitutional. Secretario v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-283.
TIMBER. The taxpayer was engaged in forest
management, logging, and the production of various wood
and paper products. Prior to 1978, the taxpayer elected to
treat the cutting of timber by it as a sale or exchange under
I.R.C. § 631(a). The IRS determined deficiencies against
the taxpayer after determining that the taxpayer incorrectly
valued the timber harvested during several years. The court
held that the best indicia of the timber's fair market value
were contemporaneous sales of comparable timber. Once
selected, the comparable sales must be adjusted to reflect
equivalent quality, quantity, accessibility, and location to
the eligible timber. Furthermore, economic trends must be
considered and adjustments made for those trends. The
adjustments to the comparable sales considered included
logging road cost adjustment; discount to current cash
value of long-term, deferred payment contracts; inclusion
of export sales in the comparable sales data base; scale
conversion; growth adjustment; adjustment for price trends
over time; logging costs; Oregon severance tax;
reallocation of bid price; utility grade timber; adjustment
for Doyle Scale; and adjustment for risk of loss. See also
Willamette Industries, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1980-
577 and T.C. Memo. 1987-479, as supplemented by T.C.
Memo. 1990-339 and T.C. Memo. 1991-389. Willamette
Industries, Inc. v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,597 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-407.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
BREACH OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff leased wheat
crop land to the defendant. The lease provided for a
minimum rent of $40,000 plus one third of the crop over
$120,000. The defendant paid a rent of $43,000 based on a
claimed $125,000 wheat crop during the year. The plaintiff
sued for additional rent, claiming that the defendant
actually harvested more wheat and should have produced
more wheat. The plaintiff produced federal crop insurance
records and the testimony of neighbor farmers as to the
production capabilities of the land and the harvest from the
land. The plaintiff argued that the lease had an implied
agreement that the defendant would farm the land in a
workmanlike manner and that the failure of the defendant
to produce more wheat was a breach of this agreement. The
jury held for the defendant. The court found that the lease
did contain a provision for the lessee to farm the land with
diligence and the lessee’s best skill and judgment. The
court held that there was no implied covenant to farm the
land in a workmanlike manner because the lease had a
provision governing the standard of conduct of the lessee.
Because the jury was presented the lease, the jury verdict
was based on knowledge of the lease provisions; therefore,
the court upheld the jury verdict for the defendant.
Schumacher v. Stephens, 956 P.2d 76 (Mont. 1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRODUCER’S LIEN. The debtor was a walnut
processor which purchased walnuts from a grower. The
debtor did not pay for any of the walnuts delivered but sold
all the walnuts and deposited the proceeds in a separate
bank account. A bank had a perfected security interest in
the debtor’s inventory, accounts receivable and proceeds
and claimed a priority security interest in the walnut
proceeds. The grower sought to extend the producer’s lien,
Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 55631, to the proceeds of the
walnuts. The court held that the producer’s lien statute had
no provision for extending the lien to the proceeds of the
walnuts, but was limited to recovery of the walnuts in
inventory. The grower argued that criminal penalties
provided in the statute for the sale of commodities without
paying the producer indicated that the grower had an
interest in the proceeds of the commodity. The court
refused to extend such an interpretation without express
language in the statute that the producer’s lien extended to
the proceeds of the commodity. Thus, the court held that
the grower did not have any security interest in the
proceeds of the walnuts and that the bank’s security interest
had priority.  The court did not discuss the issue that the
holding in this case would effectively allow the bankruptcy
estate to circumvent the criminal penalties provision since
the payment of the walnut proceeds to the bank without
payment to the producer would be a misdemeanor if done
by the debtor. In addition, the court failed to discuss the
validity of the bank’s security interest in proceeds of
commodities which the debtor was prohibited by law from
distributing to the bank or anyone other than the producer.
The California legislature clearly wanted to protect
producers and that intent was circumvented in this case. In
re Sargent Walnut Ranches, Inc., 219 B.R. 880 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1998).
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FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 4-8, 1999
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1999! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 4-8,
1999 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a
continental breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee.  Each participant will
receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 430 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated
Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to
minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and
"hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights
at a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Royal Waikoloan Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the
Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is
$695.
Subscribers should have received a brochure in the mail.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 if you would like a brochure.
